TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT : The Limits to Law, Democracy and Governance
Tribal
Development Both PESA and FRA give powers to
communities that allow them to determine their future destiny. What these laws
also do is to make the state bureaucracy and for that matter elected, mostly
non-tribal, representatives accountable to community institutions. The centre
of power will, therefore, shift and allow tribals control over their own
governance and natural resources that they are dependent upon for their
livelihood. PESA and FRA can create a legitimate political space and democratic
mechanism where equity, justice and participatory democracy are the core
Tribal Development policy from its
inception has always been beset by a contradiction, namely to recognize the uniqueness
of tribal communities (including their governance systems) but yet deliver the
benefits of mainstream development. In practice, the former has, for the most
part been undermined, seemingly to attain the latter. However, even the latter
goal mostly has not been achieved because of the wider priorities of ‘growth’
and ‘development’ for the nation. Over the last two decades since the adoption
of the New Economic Policy in 1991 and the drive to speed up the growth
process, a widening gap between the goals of national development and tribal
development has emerged. The accelerated attempt to exploit natural resources
in the name of economic growth has led to maladministration and misgovernance (‘governance
deficit’) and neglect in terms of infrastructure, development and welfare
(‘development deficit’) in tribal areas. These failures of state policy have
led to the spread of Left Wing Extremism (LWE), pervasive now in 83 districts
of the country.
This is not to say that progressive Constitutional
provisions and laws that empower tribal communities have not been periodically
passed, but rather that, these have been for the most part undermined. From
Article 244 of the Constitution, which led to the establishment of Fifth
Schedule Areas, to legislation such as the Panchayati Raj (Extension to
Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (hereafter PESA), and the Scheduled Tribes
and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006
(hereafter FRA), legal measures have been passed to empower tribal communities
to govern themselves. But invariably these legal measures have to a large
extent remained on paper because of a lack of political will to implement them,
given the economic priorities of growth.
The purpose of this paper is limited to
detailing tribal development policy in India and the tensions that exist between
mainstreaming development and protecting the rights of tribal communities.
While the historical narrative illustrates the possibilities within a
parliamentary democracy to pass ‘progressive’ legislations, it also suggests
how hegemonic discourses of development undermine these legislations in
practice.
Constitutional Protection to Tribals: Good
Intention, Limited Scope
Tribal areas were to a large extent ‘self-governing’
prior to British colonization, though many of these areas were notionally part
of nontribal states. While the British tried to colonize tribal areas, they
were often unsuccessful because of tribal resistance and revolts. One
consequence of this was an official recognition by the British of existing
customary institutional arrangements through special laws which effectively
acknowledged and permitted the relative independent existence of tribal
regions. Examples of this were Regulation XIII of 1833 that declared the
central Indian region of Chotanagpur, a non-regulated area and later the
Scheduled Districts Act of 1874 that declared certain backward districts as
scheduled so as to make existing laws not applicable in these tracts. The
Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935 further allowed for the declaration
of backward districts and the exemption of excluded or partially excluded areas
from the provisions of national and state laws. This allowed for tribal
self-governance in such areas.
Partially excluded and excluded areas were
translated into Article 244 of post-Independence India’s Constitution– the
article that sanctioned the creation of Fifth and Sixth Schedule areas. Article
244 (1) provides that the provisions of the Fifth Schedule shall apply to
the administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in
any state other than the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. A ‘Scheduled
Area’ was any area defined as such by the President. In brief, the Fifth Schedule
allowed the President to rescind any order or orders made, that were applicable
to any given state and in consultation with the Governor of the states
concerned, make fresh orders for Scheduled Areas. Para 5 (2) provides that the
Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government of Scheduled
Areas under Clause (a) to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among
members of the STs, under Clause (b) to regulate the allotment of land to
members of the STs in such areas and under Clause (c) to regulate the business
of money lending to STs.
Article 244(2)
provides for the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution and applies to the
administration of certain tribal areas in the states of Assam, Meghalaya,
Tripura and Mizoram. These areas are governed by District Councils, Autonomous Councils
and Regional Councils constituted for Autonomous Districts and Autonomous
Regions. These councils have wide ranging legislative, judicial and executive
powers with power to make rules with the approval of the Governor. Powers cover
matters such as primary schools, markets, dispensaries, ferries, cattle ponds, roads,
fisheries, road transport and water-ways. Additional powers to make laws with
respect to other matters such as secondary education, agriculture, social
security and social insurance, public health and sanitation and minor
irrigation were granted to the Autonomous Councils of the North Cachar Hills
and Karbi Anglong in Assam. Councils (excepting in Bodoland and Tripura) have
the power under the Civil Procedure Code and Criminal Procedure Code for trial
of certain suits and offences, powers to collect revenue and taxes, and powers
to regulate and manage natural resources. However, these councils do not have
the power to manage reserved forests or acquire land.
Unfortunately, Constitutional protections
have had their limits. Well over fifty per cent of STs live outside the
Scheduled Areas and hence are denied rights provided in Article 244. There are
tribal habitations in states with Scheduled Areas that are left out of the
provisions of the Fifth Schedule. Tribal habitations in the states of Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir have
not been brought under the Fifth or Sixth Schedule. Various
Government-appointed Committees have recommended including the remaining Tribal
Sub-Plan and Modified Area Development Approach (MADA) areas and
similar pockets as Scheduled Areas but the government is yet to comply with these
recommendations. At present, the Tribal Sub-Plan areas are coterminous with Scheduled
Areas in the states of Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Odisha and Rajasthan. The Dilip Singh Bhuria Committee
constituted by the central government to recommend extension of the 73rd Amendment
to Scheduled Areas has also recommended inclusion of the left out areas under
the Fifth Schedule. As recently as 2012, the National Advisory Council of the Government
of India has recommended the same. However, no follow up action has been taken.
Unfortunately, Constitutional protections have had their limits. Well over
fifty per cent of STs live outside the Scheduled Areas and hence are denied
rights provided in Article 244. There are tribal habitations in states with
Scheduled Areas that are left out of the provisions of the Fifth Schedule.
State governors have also not carried out
their duties diligently in terms of the powers conferred upon them in Scheduled
Areas. The Governor is the constitutional head of state in the states and is
appointed by the Central government. However, under Article 163 of the
Constitution, the Governor is bound to exercise his/her powers with the ‘aid
and advice’ of the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Cabinet of the elected state
government. In other words, in practice the Governor appears to be bound by
Cabinet decisions and the policy of the elected government, although there has
been significant debate as to whether this should have been the case. In fact,
an official committee found that the mandatory annual reports by Governors to
the President regarding the administration of Scheduled Areas under Para 3 of the
Fifth Schedule were irregular. Moreover, these reports contain largely stale
narrative of departmental programmes without reference to crucial issues of
administration, the main intended thrust of the Fifth Schedule. The Ministry of
Tribal Affairs, in a letter to the Governors of states having Scheduled Areas,
dated 4 April, 2013, also asserted that given the threat of mining to
inhabitants in Fifth Schedule areas, Governors should have invoked their powers
in pro-active ways to secure the rights of STs. This letter was followed by a
meeting of eight Governors organised by the Ministry in December 2013 at Jaipur
in which the same was reiterated.
Pro-active Vision – Retrograde Implementation
Notwithstanding the limited geographical
scope of the Fifth Schedule, a number of other legal initiatives have been
taken vis-à-vis tribal self governance. PESA, the result, no doubt of tribal
movements and protest, promotes people centric governance. PESA extended the
provisions of Part Nine of the Constitution, which addressed issues of
decentralization, to tribal areas. The most noteworthy features of PESA are that
it empowers gram sabhas at the hamlet (or groups of hamlet) level as opposed to
at the level of the unwieldy gram panchayat. This was done so as to safeguard
and preserve the traditions of tribal people, to prevent land alienation within
Scheduled Areas, to control (and give consent to) local development plans and
to be consulted in matters of land acquisition and rehabilitation. Additionally,
it was incumbent on the state governments having Scheduled Areas to adopt the
pattern of Sixth Schedule areas in structure and content, i.e. District
Councils with wide ranging legislative, judicial and executive powers.
A Planning Commission Working Group Report
in 2006 minced no words in saying that most states had not taken adequate
action to make PESA work. Old rules regarding money lending, forest use and
ownership, mining and excise remained in place nullifying PESA. Moreover,
powers statutorily devolved to gram sabhas were not matched with concomitant
transfer of funds and functionaries resulting in the non-exercise of such
powers.
But, here too, there have been significant
limits in terms of achievements. A Planning Commission Working Group Report in
2006 minced no words in saying that most states had not taken adequate action
to make PESA work. Old rules regarding money lending, forest use and ownership,
mining and excise remained in place, nullifying PESA. Moreover, powers statutorily
devolved to gram sabhas were not matched with concomitant transfer of funds and
functionaries resulting in the non-exercise of such powers. Despite repeated
calls by the central government and Planning Commission to rectify the flaws, the
state governments have been unresponsive. In fact, many states still have not
framed rules for implementation of PESA. Rules have only been notified in
three of the nine states that have Scheduled Areas, namely Himachal Pradesh,
Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh and that too recently. Empowering the gram sabha,
it would seem, is anathema to resource grabbing for neoliberal development.
In 2006, the FRA was enacted. The main aim
of the FRA was ‘to recognise and vest the forest rights and occupation in
forest land in forest dwelling STs and other traditional forest dwellers who
have been residing in such forests for generations but whose rights could not
be recorded; and to provide for a framework for recording the forest rights so
vested and the nature of evidence required for such recognition and vesting.’
Fourteen rights were identified excluding hunting. Individual and community
rights were to be conferred. Furthermore the law, in addition to vesting rights
on claimants, also spoke about responsibilities and authority for sustainable
use, conservation of biodiversity and maintenance of ecological balance, hence
strengthening the conservation regime of forests while ensuring the livelihood
and food security needs of forest dwellers. An elaborate procedure was
prescribed through which rights could be claimed and verified. What the Act
also implied was the need to get gram sabha consent for diversion of forest
land for projects such as mines and dams, though in practice, this has not
happened.
Weak implementation, failure to follow due
process prescribed by the Act, refusal to recognise community forest resources
and other community rights and stiff resistance by the forest bureaucracy have
been the order of the day. Although 22,35,166 hectares have been settled and
13,98,831 titles given (as on 30 September 2013) under the Act, this is only
about 15-20 per cent of the government controlled and managed forest land that comes
under this law. Moreover, the rejection rate of claims is over 50 per cent.
Tribal Development vs. Tribal Self Governance
Despite the enactment of progressive legislations
that empower tribal communities to govern themselves through their own
institutions, the main thrust of tribal development policy continues to be that
of the Integrated Tribal Development Programme (ITDP) through Tribal Sub
Plans. Tribal Sub Plans have been in operation in 22 states and two Union Territories,
i.e. in all states except the tribal majority states of Arunachal Pradesh,
Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland and in the Union Territories of Lakshadweep and
Dadra and Nagar Haveli. The main aim of the ITDP is to bring the fruits of
development to tribal areas.
ITDP and TSPs have come under a cloud for
not having had any significant impact on tribals due to inefficient delivery of
schemes, often marred by corruption and diversion of funds. Most states,
moreover, do not allocate proportionate funds as required. Despite central
guidelines from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and other agencies, most states
have also failed to set specific targets for TSP expenditure, and no states
have field monitoring mechanisms to verify how well the funds are being spent.
Considering that ITDP and TSPs are the
primary development and welfare strategy of the Government of India for STs,
there has been a clamour to provide them statutory character. Andhra Pradesh
has enacted a law, namely the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes Sub-Plan and
Tribal Sub-Plan (Planning, Allocation and Utilization of Financial Resources)
Act, 2013, that does exactly that. A similar law has recently been enacted by
Karnataka. However, these Acts are at variance with the provisions of PESA as,
under PESA the Gram Sabha is endowed with powers to oversee local plans and resources
[Sec.4(m)(vii)]. The ITDP is a bureaucracy driven programme, not one of self
governance. It cannot be a substitute for either PESA or the FRA.
It is important to note that of particular
concern are the 75 Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs), previously
called as Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs), most of whom have a precarious
existence as a result of ecological vulnerability of their habitats and the
precariousness of their livelihoods. A specific strategy for their survival
with dignity is yet to be charted out concretely though, there are some recent
initiatives to work towards this.
The National Advisory Council, like the
earlier Mungekar Committee report, noted how tribal governance has been undermined.
On 31 December, 2012, the National Advisory Council made a detailed set of
recommendations vis-à-vis governance in Scheduled Areas. The recommendations
included the need to amend PESA so as to empower gram sabhas and give them the
powers to constitute committees, the need to align central and state laws in conformity
with PESA, the importance of mandating prior informed consent for land
acquisition and the importance of including excluded tribal areas within the
Fifth Schedule.
The Governance That Could Be
The community governance regime that
underlies the FRA and PESA departs from prescriptive solutions that privilege a
bureaucracy-centred governance model. Both PESA and FRA give powers to
communities that allow them to determine their future destiny. What these laws
also do is to make the state bureaucracy and for that matter elected, mostly
nontribal, representatives accountable to community institutions. The centre of
power will, therefore, shift and allow tribals control their own governance and
natural resources that they are dependent upon for their livelihood. PESA and
FRA can create a legitimate political space and democratic mechanism where
equity, justice and participatory democracy are the core.
Skeptics might argue that these laws commit
tribal communities to a life of backwardness and that it will likely most
result in degradation, not protection of natural resources. On the contrary, it
is the tribal areas which are still richest in natural resources and where
people are waging a battle to protect resources from destruction. Tribal
self-governance, in fact, is seen as a space to develop conservation and development
solutions that counter projects that destroy natural resources in the name of
national development. Unlike the centralized, bureaucracy driven visions of
conservation and development that have for the most part failed, PESA and FRA
offer an open system of decision-making, transparency and accountability as no
other known system with space to raise and address all concerns. Quite
significantly, in March 2010, the Ministry of Panchayati Raj recommended
adoption of such a system for all areas and peoples. The question is whether
such a vision is possible given the priorities of neoliberal growth and the
increasing claims to land and resources in tribal areas?
Readings
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Bijoy, C.R. Adivasis Betrayed: Adivasi Land Rights in
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Manthan.
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p.18. Accessible at http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/am251e/am251e00.pdf
Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. Roadmap
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Accessible at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/panchayat
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in Tribal Areas, Third Report of the Standing Committee on Inter-Sectoral
Issues relating to Tribal Development, (headed by Dr. Bhalchandra Mungekar,
Member, Planning Commission, with Secretaries of some key Ministries concerned
with tribal development as Members), 2009.
Report of MPs and Experts to Make Recommendations on the
Salient Features of the Law for Extending Provisions of the Constitution (73rd)
Amendment Act, 1992 to Scheduled Areas, 1994. Accessible at http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/00-03-livelihood-options/forum/sched-areas/about/bhuria_report.html
By Ajit Menon and C R Bijoy : Ajit Menon is an Associate Professor at the Madras Institute of Development Studies. CR Bijoy is a researcher and works for tribal issues.
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